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Abstract

Using the U.S. fiscal response to Covid-19 in March and April 2020 as a case study, this paper
explores the implications that the U.S. coronavirus legislation had on the societal distribution of
responsibility for social reproduction among U.S. households, employers, and the U.S. federal
government —and its effect on women and racialized minorities. It builds on feminist political
economy research that argues that, prior to the coronavirus pandemic, economic crisis and
stagnating conditions for workers in the United States had increased the role of households and
the U.S. government in social reproduction, relative to the contribution of employers. This
paper argues that the U.S. federal government has responded to the Covid-19 crisis through an
infusion of income support, but has failed to increase its long-term socially-reproductive
commitments, nor addressed the intensified socially-reproductive burden placed on
households or the declining role of employers in working-class social reproduction.
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1. Introduction

U.S. federal spending in response to the Covid-19 crisis provides an opportunity to study state
intervention into capitalist social and economic crises from the perspective of feminist political
economy (FPE). In March and April 2020, four pieces of legislation were enacted, totaling
approximately $3 trillion dollars in new spending and tax cuts. U.S. legislators have greater
fiscal discretion because the United States does not experience the same balance-of-payment
constraints as developing countries, nor is the United States bound to international agreements
on fiscal or monetary policy, as are European Union member states. Compared with other
advanced capitalist countries, the U.S. case is unique because it lacks universal healthcare
coverage and has a for-profit, pay-for-service healthcare model. These conditions, along with
stark economic inequality, underlying health disparities based on socio-economic status and
race, and a gender gap within caregiving, have increased the health and economic
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic in the U.S (Nassif-Pires et al. 2020).

Feminist scholars and activists emphasize the critical role of non-market institutions and
activities. Care theorists study the essential role that paid and unpaid caregivers play in
economic processes related to creating human capabilities—in both labor-processes and
output terms (Braunstein, van Staveren, and Tavani 2011, p.7). Social reproduction theory
(SRT) argues that labor-power—the capacity to work—is replenished on a daily and
generational basis (Bhattacharya 2017). The work of paid and unpaid caregivers—most of
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whom are women, immigrants, or racial/ethnic minorities—is essential to social reproduction
and the development of human capabilities. Governments play an essential role through the
socialization of workers via schooling and training, funding healthcare and hospitals, and the
redistribution and supplementation of income. State policy can create, reinforce, or alter
gendered and racialized institutions, norms, and laws, while also affecting economic
provisioning for households (Mutari 2003).

As an exercise in feminist political economy (FPE), this paper is rooted in an
understanding of “the mutually constitutive relationship between gender and class, where class
is defined as the relationship of a person/group to the production, appropriation and
distribution of surplus” (Rao and Akram-Lodhi, Forthcoming, p. 1). While class categories
derived from classical political economy are employed, FPE represents a critique of “nineteenth
and twentieth century Marxism’s unwillingness to grapple with the details and dynamics of
social reproduction” (Ibid, p.6) and its neglect of identity-based inequalities. As an FPE analysis
of state intervention, this paper considers how the requirements of social reproduction
influence the historical development of state policy-making (Moos 2020, pp.2-3). However, as
noted by Folbre (Forthcoming), the welfare state is a site of “distributional conflict that reaches
far beyond tensions between capital and labor” including those based on socially-assigned
identities such as gender, race, age, nationality, and socio-economic status (p.261). From an FPE
perspective, “gender inequalities and processes of capital accumulation” are intrinsically linked,
which is why “feminist policies need to be explicitly pro-labor, grounded in an analysis of how
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labor itself is produced by the work of social reproduction” (Rao and Akram-Lodhi,
Forthcoming, p.8-9).

Using the U.S. fiscal response to Covid-19 in March and April 2020 as a case study, this paper
explores the implications that the U.S. coronavirus legislation had on the societal distribution of
responsibility for social reproduction among U.S. households, employers, and the U.S. federal
government —and its effect on women and racialized minorities. The paper builds on FPE
research that argues that, prior to the coronavirus pandemic, economic crisis and stagnating
conditions for workers in the United States had increased the role of households and the U.S.
government in social reproduction, relative to the contribution of employers (Moos 2019b).
Using cost estimates of the legislation, I estimate what percentage of the coronavirus relief
packages contribute to key aspects of state intervention into social reproduction: income
support, publicly-funded healthcare research and services, as well as education. I explore the
relationship of federal fiscal policy to households’ and employers’ responsibility for social
reproduction, and the implications for gender and racial inequality. This paper argues that the
Covid-19 pandemic has intensified the socially reproductive burden placed on households as
well as prompted the U.S. federal government to spend significant funds on income support to
compensate for the shrinking socially reproductive role played by employers. Despite the
infusion of historic levels of federal expenditures aimed at reducing the immediate threat of
recession, the U.S. fiscal response minimized its long-term commitments to social reproduction,
leaving low-wage workers, women, and people of color in vulnerable positions.
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2. Analyzing U.S. Coronavirus Fiscal Spending from the Perspective of Social Reproduction

Based on cost estimates of the U.S. coronavirus legislation published by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), a nonpartisan agency that conducts economic analyses of budgetary
issues and legislation, I categorized federal spending into social reproduction expenditures
(SRE) and non-social reproduction expenditures (non-SRE). The SRE category includes Social
Security, income support and transfers such as nutrition support, unemployment insurance,
and other direct transfers to households, funds paid to firms to pay workers, as well as federal
spending on health services, insurance, research, and education.2 Non-SREs include all other
funding and tax cuts that benefited firms or governmental agencies and were unrelated to
domestic income support, health, or education.

Together, the four bills increased federal SRE by more than $1.84 trillion dollars in budget
authority for 2020–2030, with nearly $1.5 trillion of estimated outlays in SRE in 2020. This large
sum represents only 64 and 69 percent of the total 2020–2030 budget authority and 2020
estimated outlays of the legislation, respectively. A sizable portion of the expenditures—which
include discretionary and direct spending, as well as tax cuts—are classified as non-SRE.

2

This is a very narrow definition of social reproduction expenditures. It is meant to analyze the programs with the
most direct and immediate effect of labor’s social reproduction and the creation of human capabilities. Moos
(2019b) is based on a more expansive definition of the government’s contribution to social reproduction, which
includes a greater amount of public goods and services. Furthermore, it is important to note that I am measuring
the monetary value of these expenditures, not the ultimate effect on well-being.
6

The first law, the “Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriation” (H.R.
6074, Public Law 116-123) passed March 6, 2020 and totaled nearly $8.3 billion in emergency
funding for federal agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health. Additional direct funding was also
allocated to temporarily allow telehealth services under Medicare.3 Most of the funding in this
bill—84.6 percent of the budget authority for 2020–2030, and 87 percent of the estimated
outlays for 2020—is categorized as SRE.

The “Families First Coronavirus Response Bill” (H.R. 6201, Public Law 116-127) passed March
18, 2020. It included more than $190 billion in direct relief for individuals in the form of
nutrition assistance, an expansion of protections under the Family Medical Leave Act for
caregivers who must miss work due to school or daycare closings, emergency unemployment
insurance, emergency paid sick leave for Covid-19 patients, and additional spending for health
provisions.4 Nearly all of the funding in this bill—99 percent of both the budget authority for
2020–2030 and of the estimated outlays for 2020—is characterized as SRE. Table 1 lists the
specific SRE measures in the Families First Act; see appendix for non-SRE measures.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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Congressional Budget Office. “CBO Estimate for H.R. 6074, the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 as posted on March 4, 2020.” https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/202003/hr6074.pdf

4

Congressional Budget Office. “Preliminary Estimate of the Effects of H.R. 6201, the Families First Coronavirus
Response Act.” April 2, 2020. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56316
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The “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act” (H.R. 748, Public Law 116136) passed March 27, 2020. This is the largest of the four laws, representing nearly $2.3
trillion. Major social reproduction aspects of the law include expanded unemployment
insurance and compensation, direct payments of up to $1,200 to individuals, healthcare
services and coronavirus testing, nutrition assistance, paid sick and family medical leave, and
funding for childcare, primary, secondary, and higher educational institutions. This bill provided
funding for firms to continue to pay their employees, similar to the approach in European
countries.5 Unlike the two preceding bills, the CARES Act included a significant amount of nonSRE funding. Approximately 65 percent of the budget authority for 2020–2030 and 73 percent
of the estimated outlays for 2020 are categorized as SRE. As the CARES Act was by far the
largest and most expensive of the four pieces of legislation, this means that a significant
amount of non-SREs—more than 790 billion in budget authority in 2020–2030—were included
in this bill alone. Table 2 lists the specific SRE measures in the CARES Act; see appendix for nonSRE measures and details on the remaining two bills.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

“The Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act” (H.R. 266, Public Law
116-139) was signed into law on April 24, 2020. The law provides nearly $484 billion in

Congressional Budget Office. “Preliminary Estimate of the Effects of H.R. 748, the CARES Act, Public Law 116136.” April 16, 2020. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56334
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additional funding for small business loans, health care providers, and coronavirus testing.6
Most of the funding in this bill—87 percent of the budget authority for 2020–2030, and 85
percent of the estimated outlays for 2020—is characterized as SRE.

3. The U.S. Federal Fiscal Role in Social Reproduction, with and without Covid-19

To understand how U.S. coronavirus legislation has affected federal funding for labor’s social
reproduction in 2020, I analyze CBO projections before and after the pandemic. My analysis of
the CBO projections illuminates what information Congress had on the potential redistributive
effect of fiscal policy and how the legislation was anticipated to affect the U.S. economy. My
interest in analyzing CBO projections is to better understand how federal coronavirus legislation
altered the role of the U.S. federal government in social reproduction, and which aspects of
social reproduction became emphasized as a result of the pandemic. Examining the pre- and
post-pandemic estimates allows us to compare the anticipated effect of the legislation with the
counterfactual situation where the pandemic had not occurred.

On March 6, 2020, the CBO published a baseline budget projection that excludes the effect of
the coronavirus-related legislation.7 Pre-coronavirus virus projections are based on the March 6

Congressional Budget Office. 2020e. “CBO Estimate for H.R. 266, the Paycheck Protection Program and Health
Care Enhancement Act as Passed by the Senate on April 21, 2020.” April 22, 2020.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56338

6

7

Congressional Budget Office. “Baseline Budget Projections as of March 6, 2020.” Publication No. 56268.
Washington, DC. Supplemental spending projections data available: https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economicdata Accessed March 8, 2020.
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budget document; post-coronavirus projections include the costs of the four pieces of
legislation. These figures were calculated by summing up the estimated outlays in the March 6
document, then adding the estimated outlays in the four coronavirus bills to the baseline
estimate. See appendix for methodology and data.

As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, income support is projected to increase from 11 percent
of total federal expenditures to 22 percent of total federal expenditures in 2020. This is a result
of the recovery rebates sent to individuals, extended unemployment insurance, paid leave, the
paycheck protection program, nutrition support, relief for states, and other sources of income
supplements. In absolute terms, projected 2020 income support expenditures increased from
an estimated $524 billion before the pandemic to nearly $1.52 trillion as a result of the
legislation.

The share of expenditures on Medicare and health—which included Medicaid as well as
research, training, and activities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
National Institutes of Health—decrease as a percentage of total federal expenditures as a result
of the legislation. The increase in Medicare and health spending in absolute terms was
relatively modest. While projected Medicare spending as a percentage of total expenditures
declined from 14.7 percent to 10 percent, in absolute terms it increased from $695.8 billion to
$700 billion as a result of the pandemic. Projected health spending decreased as a percentage
of total expenditures from 12.7 percent to 10.4 percent, but in absolute terms it increased from
$600 billion to $719 billion as a result of the coronavirus policy changes.
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In both relative and absolute terms, Congress responded more to the social reproduction crisis
of lost incomes than to the social reproduction crises related to public health. The emphasis on
income support and neglect of health reveals the federal government’s attempt to stabilize
aggregate demand, but reluctance to expand its role in providing health insurance or services.
The unwillingness of the U.S. Congress to replace a healthcare system in which millions of
people lost health insurance during a pandemic with a single-payer system could be considered
a result of path dependency. However, it is important to note that prior to the pandemic,
Medicare and Medicaid were each individually more expensive than federal income support. In
2020, income support will be costlier than Medicare and Medicaid combined. Furthermore,
there are significant racial disparities in this pandemic—people of color are more likely to
experience hospitalization and death as a result of Covid-19 (Nassif Pires et al 2020, p.4). It
should not be considered incidental that Congress is responding to the current crisis as if it
were primarily a collapse of aggregate demand, and not also a public health emergency in
which the U.S. healthcare system is seriously ill equipped to respond.
These laws could be interpreted as demonstrating how institutional inertia shapes U.S. social
policy, even in times of severe crisis. There is certainly political resistance to increasing or even
maintaining SRE funding—especially for public health programs—among many members of the
U.S. Congress. Increased funding for existing counter-cyclical programs such as unemployment
insurance and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) were favored over more
radical proposals such as Medicare-for-All. Some heralded the recovery rebates, also called
economic impact payments, authorized in the CARES Act “as a rare example of a direct cash
11

transfer in American history” (Oxfam 2020, p. 22). However, these payments took the form of a
negative income tax—a policy-tool favored by both U.S. conservatives and liberals that has
grown in importance as other transfer programs were cut during welfare reform of the 1990s
(Moos 2019a, p.601).
While path dependency is a feature of the policy-making process, it does not explain all of the
important outcomes of this legislation. The Families First and CARES Acts also represent a
significant expansion of rights for some workers. The laws provided an estimated 65 million
private-sector and 22 million public-sector workers with up to two weeks of paid, job-protected
sick days, which in many cases can also be used for childcare purposes—but only for Covid-19
related work absences (NPWF 2020). An expansion of job protections and paid leave were
largely considered political “nonstarters” before the pandemic, but were “achievable in these
remarkable circumstances” (Oxfam 2020, p.22). However, the exclusion of firms with more
than 500 workers from the paid leave provisions meant that approximately 59 million workers,
a disproportionate number of whom are women of color, were ineligible (NPWF 2020).
Industry concentration and the corresponding power of large firms to avoid labor legislation
increases workers vulnerability, especially in industries in which women and people of color are
segmented. Furthermore, it is important to note that the paid leave was largely financed
through tax credits to firms, and therefore any increased costs to firms were subsidized by the
federal government.
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4. The Distribution of Responsibility for Labor’s Social Reproduction, Before and During the
Pandemic

To elucidate the pre-existing political-economic context in which the coronavirus pandemic and
U.S. legislation occurred, I review recent research by Moos (2019b) which identifies broad
trends in the distribution of responsibility for U.S. working-class social reproduction in the late
20th and early 21st century.8 With the aid of recent data and surveys, these historical trends
are used to deduce the effect of the coronavirus pandemic and legislation on the distribution of
U.S. social reproduction among class categories and within households.

3.1 The Role of Households in Social Reproduction and the Implications for Gender and Racial
Inequality
Using a satellite account with imputed monetary values of household production published by
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Moos (2019b) finds that for every year between
1959 and 2012, unpaid household production contributed more to working-class social
reproduction than employers contributed through the sum of net wages, employer-based
benefits, and contributions to social insurance. The imputed value of household production
used in this analysis should be understood as a lower-bound, as the imputation method used by
the BEA—based on a generalist approach—is considered by feminist time-use researchers to be
an underestimate as it excluded supervisory care and other factors (Suh and Folbre 2016, see

Working-class households are defined as those that do not have enough wealth to forgo working for income, and
do not exercise a supervisory role in their jobs (Moos 2019b, p.7).
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also Moos 2019b, p.10). Alternative measurements of household production, such as those
suggested by Suh and Folbre (2016) would likely show an even greater discrepancy between
the socially reproductive roles of households and employers during this time period.9

As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is likely that the contribution of unpaid household
production will increase substantially, as hours spent in unpaid domestic and care work have
increased as a result of school and daycare center closings during the pandemic. A survey
conducted by UN Women during May 1–3, 2020 in 18 countries, including the U.S., found that
many women report that their unpaid care work has increased as a result of the pandemic.10 A
poll conducted by Data for Progress found that in early May, 55 percent of women and 73
percent of men surveyed in the U.S. reported that the time they spent in unpaid domestic and
care work increased as a result of Covid-19 stay-at-home orders—in many cases as much as five
hours or more per day (Oxfam 2020, p.9). Unpaid care and domestic work have increased most
for households containing children and/or elders, and for people of color (Oxfam 2020, p.9).

A greater reliance on the household for social reproduction during the coronavirus stay-athome orders and school closings appears to reinforce traditional gendered division of unpaid
work. Research suggests that during the pandemic, while the total hours spent on unpaid care
and domestic work have increased, the distribution between men and women has stayed the

9

Furthermore, Moos (2019b) assumes that all net wages are used to finance past, present, or future household
social reproduction. This simplifying assumption may be true for budget-constrained households, but does not
distinguish between necessary and other types of consumption.
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UN Women study: https://data.unwomen.org/features/ipsos-survey-confirms-covid-19-intensifying-womensworkload-home Accessed August 5, 2020.
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same, with women doing more unpaid housework than men (Oxfam 2020, p.15–16). A similar
result was found during the Great Recession and jobless recovery—the disparity among unpaid
work hours between mothers and fathers was “virtually unchanged” from pre-recession levels
(Berik and Kongar 2013, p.210).

While the closing of schools and daycare centers was necessary from a public health
perspective, it likely reinforced or intensified the pre-existing gendered division of paid labor.
Recent analysis reveals that during the pandemic mothers have reduced their paid working
hours more than fathers, even when both partners are able to telework (Collins, Lavdivar,
Ruppanner, Scarbourgh 2020). Analyzing data from the U.S. Current Population Survey,
Heggeness (2020) concluded that “The impact [of the stay-at-home orders] on short-term work
productivity and engagement appeared to be borne entirely on the backs of mothers” (p.18). In
addition, the U.S. media has predicted that the pandemic will create long-term labor market
scaring for U.S. women with children.11

3.2 The Role of Employers in Social Reproduction
Employers contribute to workers’ social reproduction by paying for wages and salaries, benefits
such as pensions and health insurance, and taxes which partially fund social insurance schemes.
Moos (2019b) defines the sum of three factors as the cost of employment (CE), and compares it
to the total societal cost of working-class social reproduction (CSRW), which also includes the
11

See: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/business/economy/coronavirus-working-women.html
and https://www.wsj.com/articles/womens-careers-could-take-long-term-hit-from-coronavirus-pandemic11594814403
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imputed value of unpaid household production, government social spending, consumer
borrowing,12 and expenditures of non-profit organizations serving households (Moos 2019b,
pp.9-16). In 1966, the CE/CSR for working-class households was 50 percent, by 2011 it was 38
percent (Moos 2019b, p.16).

The decrease in employer contributions to total working-class social reproduction is a secular
trend, although it does appear to be influenced by the business cycle. This trend is being driven
by wage stagnation, the erosion of employer-based benefits, and the growth of low wage
jobs—features of the US economy since 1979 (Howell and Kallenberg 2019). In addition, during
and immediately following economic downturns, the CE/CSR falls. The most dramatic decreases
in the working-class CE/CSR occurred during the second oil shock between 1973 and 1975, and
the Great Recession from 2007 to 2010 (Moos 2019b, p.15).

The economic vulnerability underlying the reduced contribution of employers to working-class
social reproduction in the late 20th and early 21st century is more severe for women and
people of color. Albelda, Bell-Pasht, Konstantinidis (2020) found that women and people of
color were more likely to hold “precarious jobs” and that precarious workers of color were
significantly more likely to be economically insecure than their white counterparts (p.554-5).

12

Mortgages are excluded due to simplifying assumptions with regard to mortgage debt and housing wealth
(Moos 2019b, p. 11).
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As a result of the Covid-19 crisis, it appears likely that the contribution of firms to working-class
social reproduction will further decrease, which will exacerbate these gender and racial
inequalities. Due to the 19.6 million net job losses that occurred between the start of the
pandemic and May 2020, wages and employer-based benefits have declined substantially.13
Between February and May 2020, 5.9 million U.S. workers lost health insurance as a result of
being laid off, the most substantial decrease ever recorded for the United States.14

Women and people of color—and especially women of color—have been particularly hard hit in
the Covid-19 recession. In April 2020, the unemployment rate for white men and white women
was 12.4 and 15 percent, respectively. The same month, the unemployment rate for Black men
and Black women was 16.1 and 16.4 percent, respectively. The unemployment rates for Latinx
workers were even higher: in April 2020 they were 16.7 for Latinos and 20.2 percent for Latinas.
Recovery is significantly slower for minorities—while the August unemployment rate decreased
to 6.9 and 7.3 percent for white men and women, it remained persistently higher for people of
color.15 Race and gender segmentation in the U.S. labor market, in particular the crowding of
women and racialized groups into healthcare and service sector jobs, caused the Covid-19
recession to be particularly harmful to women and racialized minorities, with women of color
suffering the most severe consequences.

13

Net job losses: https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/May-Jobs-FS.pdf Accessed August 5, 2020.
Loss in health insurance: https://www.familiesusa.org/resources/the-covid-19-pandemic-and-resultingeconomic-crash-have-caused-the-greatest-health-insurance-losses-in-american-history/ Accessed August 5,
2020.
15
Unemployment data: https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/ Accessed September 20, 2020.
14
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3.3 The Role of the U.S. Welfare State in Social Reproduction
The U.S. welfare state is marked by stingy, contributory and non-universal benefits—especially
in comparison to other advanced capitalist countries. Even in a political climate that has
become increasingly hostile to social spending, U.S. social spending has continued to rise in
absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP since 1980, although it still lags behind the OECD
average.16 Relative to the contribution of employers, Moos (2019b) finds that the contribution
of government social spending to total working-class social reproduction grew steadily since the
1960s. From 1959 to 1990, employers’ contribution to social reproduction was a greater
contributor to social reproduction than the sum of total federal, state, and local social
spending. In the mid-1990s, the state’s contribution became roughly equal to employers’
contributions, and eventually overtook employers’ contributions by 2002 (Moos 2019b, p.19).

An aging population increases U.S. federal social spending, as the two largest programs—Social
Security and Medicare—benefit older populations. However, the shift occurred before the
eldest baby boomers became eligible for these programs. Rising healthcare costs are a major
source of the increased social spending, but are not the only factor (Moos 2019a, p.596-598).

The shifting relationship between government social spending and employers’ contribution to
working-class social reproduction began in an era of increased free trade and a decrease in
labor protections, the erosion of employer-based benefits, wage stagnation, and economic
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OECD Statistics on Social Expenditures: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG# Accessed
September 20, 2020.
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inequality and vulnerability in the U.S. A high level of prolonged unemployment in the Great
Recession, the jobless recovery, and the expansion of low-wage jobs (which increases eligibility
and use of programs such as SNAP and refundable tax credits) also contribute to the increase in
social spending (Moos 2019a, p.595). The increase of social spending in this context is
consistent with what Rodrik (2017) calls “compensating those who end up with smaller slices”
due to globalization, which he has observed in many European countries, but is often
overlooked as having occurred in the United States (p.2).

Due to the Covid-19 crisis, federal expenditures for workers have risen as a combination of
automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance and SNAP, as well as increases in new
spending authorized in the coronavirus legislation, as discussed in the preceding section. It is
important to note that state and local governments also contribute to social reproduction, and
that this spending is included in the analysis by Moos (2019b), but not captured in the CBO
estimates. As of June 30, 29 U.S. states had enacted budget legislation in response to Covid-19,
a mix of supplemental appropriations and transfers in “rainy day” or reserve funds.17 However,
states also face historic budget shortfalls which will have a devasting effect on employment as
well as accessibility and quality of social services.18 A state-level analysis would illuminate a
more complete picture of the effect of the pandemic on the government’s role in social
reproduction, as well as reveal deep inequalities in the U.S. resulting from the specific effects of

17

State Fiscal Responses to Covid-19: https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-fiscal-responses-to-covid19.aspx Accessed September 17, 2020.
18
State and local budget shortfall: https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-continue-to-facelarge-shortfalls-due-to-covid-19-effects Accessed September 17, 2020.
19

the crisis on regional economies as well as budgetary decisions made at the state and local
level.

5. Conclusion
This paper has argued that the U.S. federal government has responded to the Covid-19 crisis
through an infusion of income support, but has failed to increase its long-term sociallyreproductive commitments, nor addressed the intensified socially-reproductive burden placed
on households or the declining role of employers in working-class social reproduction. The
increased socially-reproductive role of households and the declining contribution of employers
further exacerbates class, gender, and racial/ethnic inequalities, which from the perspective of
FPE are intrinsically linked. Employers benefit from the output of social reproduction—a readily
employable workforce—because households, particularly the women within them, have
continued and even increased their hours of unpaid household labor. This also further
disadvantages women relative to men, by undermining women’s position in paid employment.
Racialized and immigrant women are put at an even greater disadvantage relative to employers
and men, especially white men, due to intersectional oppressions, and their disproportionate
role in the care economy.

The increased role of the U.S. federal government in social reproduction is double-edged. While
there are enormous benefits to social insurance schemes in terms of equity, efficiency, and
reliability, there are social risks associated with a greater reliance on government transfers
rather than earned incomes, especially for marginalized, racialized communities. The recovery

20

rebates excluded many immigrants and their households—even those containing U.S. citizens.
It also required low-income households without a tax liability to file tax returns in order to
qualify for benefits, a process that can be difficult depending on literacy, access to internet, and
other socio-economic barriers.19 The expansion of the role of government cash transfers—
which gives Congress greater control over the distribution of income when it replaces wages—
must be understood in the current political context. As Folbre (Forthcoming) notes, the growth
of public expenditures has meant that “their distribution became more consequential, often
intensifying racist, nationalist and gendered allegiances” (p.281) among policy-makers and
within the working class. Without a commitment to equality, the increased role of the federal
government in the distribution of social reproduction can improve the livelihoods of some
groups, while disadvantaging others.

While a sufficiently high-level of income support could help households meet their socially
reproductive needs, one should not expect cash transfers to automatically achieve feminist
goals in the current U.S. context. The perverse nature of the existing U.S. welfare state—which
subsidizes low-wage private-sector jobs through in-work benefits—perpetuates inequality and
poverty. In comparison to European countries, post-1990s U.S. social policy creates stronger
incentivizes and requirements for workers, especially women and people of color, to accept
low-wage employment (Gautíe et al 2010, p.170-175). For this reason, feminist should
approach proposals for a universal basic income (UBI) with caution and scrutiny. The optimistic

19

IRS Rules: https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/economic-impact-payments-what-you-need-to-know Accessed
August 5, 2020.
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view of McKay (2001) that the “divorce [of] work and income” through UBI will result in greater
“gender-neutral social citizenship rights” seem unlikely to play out in the current U.S. context.

In order to respond as an adequate and equalizing social reproducer of last resort during and
after the pandemic, the U.S. government would have to respond through truly universal
transfers, employment protections, single-payer healthcare, and paid family sick leave for all
workers— and for all reasons, not only as a result of Covid-19 infections or school closures.
These types of policies—which could, in theory, emerge in response to a social and economic
crisis of this magnitude—could achieve much more equitable outcomes and reduce
stratification among race, national origin, class, and gender if they were designed with the aid
of gender-responsive budgeting (GRB).20 Federal policy could also be used to require employers
to take on a greater role in social reproduction, by mandating a reduction in work hours while
keeping wages constant. The funding mechanisms of these policies—whether financed through
corporate tax revenue and a reduction in profits, higher prices passed on to consumers, or
taxes paid by the working class—would determine who ultimately financed these social
protections and have important implications in the societal distribution of working-class social
reproduction.

20

See ILO publication on gender-responsive budgeting (GRB): https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_111403.pdf Accessed September 20, 2020.
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Table 1: Family First Coronavirus Response Act (HR 6201) Social Reproduction Expenditures (In Billions)
2020-2030
Budget
Authority
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services
Interior, Indian Health Service

2020 Estimated
Outlays

Type of Spending

SRE Function

1
0.064

0.54
0.047

Discretionary
Discretionary

Income Support
Health

Labor Health and Human Services, Education

1.25

0.175

Discretionary

Veterans

Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration
SNAP Waivers for Work Requirements

0.06
2.74

0.04
0.63

Discretionary
Direct

Veterans
Income Support

Supplemental SNAP Benefits

18.5

9.8

Direct

Income Support

0

0

Direct

Income Support

4.97

1.045

Direct

Income Support

Emergency Paid Sick Leave

0.055

0

Direct

Income Support

Health Insurance Coverage

0.007

0

Direct

Health

Medicare

6.725

2.75

Direct

Medicare

Medicaid and CHIP

1.875

1.097

Direct

Health

48.647

29.182

Direct

Health

0.204

0.105

Direct

Health

Refundable Credits for Paid Sick Leave & Paid Family Medical Leave

10.196

8.667

Direct

Income Support

Revenue Effect of Expanded Unemployment Eligibility

-0.217

0

Increase in Revenue

Income Support

0.004

0

Decrease in Revenue

Health

-0.0252

-0.0103

Increase in Revenue

Health

94.659

84.46

Decrease in Revenue

Income Support

190.7138

138.5277

Paid Sick Leave
Emergency Unemployment Insurance

Federal Matching Assistance (CHIP)
Medicaid Allotment to U.S. Territories

Health Insurance Coverage
Federal Matching Assistance Percentage (CHIP)
Tax Credits for Paid Sick and Paid Family Medical Leave
Social Reproduction Expenditures

Total SRE
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Table 2:CARES Act (HR 748) Social Reproduction Expenditures, In Billions

Keeping American Workers Paid and Employed
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance

2020-2030 Budget
Authority
377

2020 Estimated
Outlays
377

Type of Spending
Direct

SRE Function
Income Support

35

30

Direct

Income Support

176
51

175
12

Direct
Direct

Income Support
Income Support

2

1

Direct

Income Support

151
3

139
2

Direct
Direct

Income Support
Income Support

Supporting America's Health Care System, Education

9

9

Direct

Education

Increasing Medicare Telehealth Flexibilities
Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System

2
3

0
2

Direct
Direct

Medicare
Medicare

Increased Access to Postacute Care

4

1

Direct

Health

8
32

2
22

Direct
Direct

Health
Income Support

150

150

Direct

Income Support

10
5

10
3

Direct
Decreases in Revenue

Health
Income Support

142

131

Decreases in Revenue

Income Support

Employee Retention Credit for Employers

55

49

Decreases in Revenue

Income Support

Expansion of Qualified Medical Expenses

9

0

Decreases in Revenue

Health

Other Healthcare Tax Provisions

0

0

Decreases in Revenue

Health

127

24

Discretionary

Health

Education Stabilization Fund

31

4

Discretionary

Education

Department of Veterans Affairs

20

6

Discretionary

Veterans

71
1473

36
1185

Discretionary
Total SRE

Income Support

Emergency Increase in Unemployment Compensation
Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Other Unemployment Compensation Provisions
Recovery Rebates for Individuals
Employee Retention Credit

Department of Health and Human Services
Pandemic Relief for Aviation Workers
Coronavirus Relief Funds (to States and Tribal Govs)
Title VI – Misc. (USPS Borrowing for delivery of medical)
Unemployment Insurance Revenue Provisions
Recovery Rebates for Individuals

HHS Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund

Title IV Other (includes programs administered by USDA)
Social Reproduction Expenditures
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